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A Police Specialist Rape Investigation Unit: A Comparative Analysis of Performance 
and Victim Care
This article examines quantitative and qualitative data in an analysis of the workings of a 
specialist rape investigation unit and compares its performance with a non-specialist 
investigative approach over a two-year period. Prior to this study, no robust research 
that compares specialist and non-specialist rape investigations has been conducted. The 
research finds that the specialist unit outperformed the non-specialist investigative 
approach in many, though not all performance measures, including charging and 
‘reached court’ rates in rape cases, retention of cases characterised by complex victim 
vulnerability, allocation of Sexual Assault Investigation Trained (SAIT) officers, rate of 
referral to Independent Sexual Violence Advisors (ISVA) and accuracy of crime recording. 
Further, police officer interview data suggests that team working and support, 
communication and a sense of common purpose were definitive features of the 
specialist unit, when contrasted to experience of working in a non-specialist policing 
environment.  These findings have policy and resource implications for the policing of 
rape and the need to achieve the best possible investigative standards in sexual offence 
cases, including the provision of appropriate care and addressing the needs of highly 
vulnerable victims. The article concludes by arguing that there is a growing body of 
evidence to suggest that investigative specialism is a crucial element in the police 
response to rape. 
Keywords: Rape, Policing, Victims, Investigative specialism, Specialist units
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Introduction
The response of the police service to the investigation of rape allegations  continues to 
be a major concern for government, criminal justice agencies, media and specialist 
support services. Amid criticism concerning such things as victim care, investigative 
standards and case outcomes (Kelly et al, 2005, IPCC 2010, Angiolini 2015) the police 
service in England and Wales has made significant efforts to address these and other 
concerns (Stern 2010, Horvath & Yexley 2012, Angiolini 2015). One means by which the 
police service has sought to improve its response to rape has been through the creation 
of specialist investigation units with the aim of, inter alia improving victim care and 
engagement, the quality of police investigations and inter-agency working. As of April 
2012, of 43 police forces, 17 had specialist rape or sexual assault units, five had partially 
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specialist units and two were in the process of creating a unit (Westmarland et al 2012, 
p. 2). Today, specialist units operate within the context of large year-on-year increases 
in recorded allegations of rape and sexual assault (Office of National Statistics, 2018), 
increasing case complexity and significantly reduced financial resourcing (APCC 2015, 
Barrett 2015, HMICFRS 2017). Further, in a 2011 Association of Chief Police Officers 
report, it was observed: ‘… there is insufficient empirical data available on which to base 
any firm conclusions as to the benefits of adopting dedicated investigation team 
approach’ [sic] (ACPO 2011, p. 5).
This article helps to  fill this existing evidential gap by using quantitative and qualitative 
data to comparatively analyse a specialist and non-specialist policing response to rape. It 
examines the performance of Avon and Somerset Constabulary’s ‘Operation Bluestone’, 
specialist rape investigation unit, which operated between September 2009 and July 
2014 with a non-specialist comparator. The remit of Bluestone was the investigation of 
rape and other serious sexual offences in the city of Bristol involving victims 14 years 
and older. The evaluation uses new qualitative and quantitative data covering all 
recorded allegations of rape/attempted rape over a two-year period to examine the 
progression of cases within Bluestone and the comparator, focusing on issues of 
attrition, victim care, vulnerability and accuracy of crime recording. This is the first time 
an analysis of this type has been conducted on the work of a specialist rape investigation 
unit. The article will proceed by examining the history and work of specialist rape 
investigation units.   
The existing literature on specialist policing in rape and sexual offence cases 
In the UK, the need for a specialist approach to child abuse and rape cases was identified 
from the 1980s onwards (Blair 1985, Lloyd and Burman 1996). One of the earliest 
domestic examples of investigative specialism was the creation of a unit comprising five 
female police officers by Thames Valley Police following the notorious 1982 BBC 
documentary, A Complaint of Rape in which a rape complainant was treated in a 
dismissive and hostile manner by detectives (Foley 1990). The objectives underpinning 
the creation of specialist units have remained largely unchanged over time 
(Metropolitan Police Authority 2002; 2002a, Project Sapphire 2002, Avon & Somerset 
Constabulary 2011) and while specialist units appear to have public support (Farand 
2016) there is only limited evidence illustrating how a specialised response to rape may 
deliver benefits in terms of policing performance. 
The international literature has examined investigative specialism in the context of a 
range of crimes, including domestic violence and sexual offences. For instance, recent 
research found that a specialist domestic violence police unit led to an increase in the 
number of cases progressing through the criminal justice process (Regoeczi and Hubbard 
2018). Earlier research on the impact of specialism in domestic violence cases has found 
mixed results (van Staden and Lawrence 2010). This has resulted, in part, from differing 
study methodologies, lack of scientific rigour and robust comparative data (Regoeczi and 
Hubbard 2018, p. 4). Research examining investigative specialism in cases of rape and 
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sexual assault is quite limited, but largely positive. An early, small scale North American 
study that compared police responses before and after the introduction of a specialist 
sexual offences investigative unit suggested an improvement in officer attitudes and 
other  improvements that only ‘occurred at points of least resistance’ (LaFree 1989, pp. 
80-89). More recent data from Australia found that victims of sexual assault viewed a 
specialist police unit response more favourably than a non-specialist response across all 
measures, including victim care, updating, access to services and timeliness of response 
(Powell and Cauchi 2013, pp. 238-239). Similarly, in a study of police officers and other 
professional stakeholders it was found that Australian specialist unit reforms were 
viewed very positively, in several areas including: inter-agency working, victim 
satisfaction and facilitation of communication (Powell and Wright 2011-2012). 
In 2010, the Home Office published the results of a pilot study based on views with 
officers who worked in a specialist sexual assault investigation unit. The study found 
that officers perceived the unit as creating a ‘joint working’ approach (van Staden and 
Lawrence 2010, p. 12) in which detectives and a SAIT officer1 worked together in 
progressing the investigation. It was argued that this inter alia improved victim support, 
sped up the investigative process, allowed for continuity in terms of staffing, reduced 
victim withdrawal, improved officer confidence in dealing with sexual offence cases and 
‘increased confidence in each other’s ability’ (van Staden and Lawrence 2010, pp. 12-
14). In later research, improvements to victim care and investigative expertise were also 
suggested by interviewees (Westmarland et al, 2012), but neither study examined case 
files to test the accuracy of interviewee perceptions or a comparator to measure 
improvement.  
In the context of the broader debate concerning austerity and police funding, forces 
now appear to be (re)assessing their strategies with regard to units specialising in sexual 
offences. Most recently, Greater Manchester Police (GMP) and the Metropolitan Police 
reassigned sexual offence unit detectives to local teams (Williams and Keeling 2017, 
Beckford 2018, Metropolitan Police 2018).In the case of the GMP, its Serious Sexual 
Offences Unit is the latest unit to be disbanded following closures in several other force 
areas in recent years. The closure of specialist units runs counter to the findings of 
successive HMICFRS reports examining investigative specialism in criminal cases. Most 
recently, HMICFRS, noted: ‘we found a continuing disparity in the quality of 
investigations undertaken in specialist units where the quality of investigation is 
generally good and non-specialist units where all too often the quality of investigation is 
poor’ (HMICFRS 2018, pp. 46-47). It also runs counter to an earlier independent review 
of rape investigation in London which recommended investment in specialist units 
(Angiolini 2015, para 21, recommendation 29). Further, a recent proposal by the British 
Transport Police to disband its specialist sexual offences investigation unit was 
1 The research makes reference to SOIT (Sexual Offences Investigative Trained) officers. This article uses 
the term SAIT (Sexual Assault Investigation Team) officer throughout for the purpose of consistency given 
that the Bluestone and comparator area use the term ‘SAIT’. The differing terminology reflects differences 
between individual police forces.    
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withdrawn following public opposition (Farand 2016) and police in the Republic of 
Ireland have recently created specialist units to deal with sexual offence cases (Lally 
2017).  It is in this context that we proceed by setting out the mixed methodology used 
in this study to address some of the gaps in the current literature.   
Methodology 
1. Approach
A mixed-methods approach was adopted for this study allowing for the collection of 
both quantitative (case file based) and qualitative (interview) data. All potentially 
identifying information was removed prior to extraction and data analysis, and the 
research was given approval from the relevant university ethics committee. The 
researchers sought to examine the following questions: Do rape investigations 
performed by officers in a specialist unit have different trajectories through the criminal 
justice system in comparison to those conducted by non-specialist officers? Do specialist 
unit investigations provide different standards of victim support compared to the non-
specialist response? How is the specialist model and non-specialist response 
experienced and perceived by police officers?  
Primarily, the research team sought to construct an extensive quantitative database 
containing detailed information on the progression and outcomes of a large number of 
rape (including attempted rape) investigations conducted by Avon and Somerset 
constabulary over a 2-year period.  Such an approach of ‘reconstructing’ investigations 
via this method has been successfully used in many studies that have focused on rape 
investigations in England and Wales over the last twenty years (e.g. Kelly et al, 2005, 
Feist et al, 2007, Burton et al, 2012), though has not been used previously to examine 
and contrast specialist vs. non-specialist data. In addition, in-depth interviews were 
conducted with nine serving police officers of various ranks, all of whom had experience 
of working in a non-specialist policing environment, and most of whom (seven) had or 
were working in the Bluestone unit. These interviews provided important insights into 
the workings of both approaches to rape investigation, as well as assisting the 
interpretation of trends emerging in the quantitative data. Further details on both 
elements of this study are provided below. 
2. Quantitative Data
Prior to the data collection, Avon and Somerset constabulary provided the research 
team with access to its case file logs for all rapes and attempted rapes reported to 
Bluestone in the calendar years 2010 and 2011. This data included crimes reported by 
both males and females, and given Bluestone’s remit, only included victims aged 14 and 
above at the time of report. Access was granted to a further set of case files featuring 
non-specialist police investigations that took place in the same time period. Through a 
process of reading and coding the file data, the research team constructed a 
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quantitative database in the form of an excel spreadsheet, and subsequently performed 
an analysis of the data using statistical software packages in both excel and SPSS. In 
coding the data, binary variables were constructed to denote the presence or absence 
of a case characteristic. For example, if a victim mental health concern could be 
identified in the case file data, this would subsequently be represented by coding ‘1’ in 
the explanatory variable for ‘victim mental health issue’. If this factor was not present, 
then a ‘0’ would be entered instead. The construction of the database involved 
collecting detailed information on both victim and suspect demographics, case 
characteristics and other factors that the previous literature has identified as having an 
impact upon case progression (e.g. various forms of vulnerability, time between offence 
and report amongst others). All were converted into the binary coding framework.  The 
team also gathered case narratives that lay outside of the framework to aid 
interpretation of the quantitative data. Once all case files had been coded, the team 
were able to establish key demographic features between a Bluestone (1) and a 
comparator (0) sample, as well as descriptive ‘performance’ (i.e. attrition, victim care, 
case outcomes) profiles for both groups. In order to assess whether some of the 
differences in outcomes were significant, Pearson’s chi square tests of association were 
used to assess paired observations such as whether victims dealt with under the 
Bluestone model and the comparator group differed in the frequency with which they 
were referred to victim support. These statistical tests were conducted through 
contingency table functions. Where the outcomes of testing delivered chi square 
probabilities of .05 or less, they are referred to in this paper as ‘statistically significant’ 
and presented as ‘P<0.05’ accordingly. Results that did not meet the .05 threshold are 
not reported as ‘significant’ in this study, though some of the ‘non-significant’ results 
feature prominently in our discussion, with associated caveats.  
A key challenge for this study lay in establishing an appropriate comparator (i.e., non-
Bluestone) sample of rape investigations. Bluestone team investigations were confined 
to central Bristol and establishing an identical ‘like-for-like’ comparator that mirrored 
the characteristics of this urban area was not possible. The comparator sample was 
comprised of all rape investigations in an anonymous non-specialist policing area. As a 
result, the Bluestone investigations contained a range of case types that were not 
present in the comparator sample that in this instance, were specific to the inner-city 
environment. These included reports made in the context of sex work/on-street 
prostitution (Bluestone N=38, Comparator N=0) and from victims experiencing 
homelessness (Bluestone N=22, Comparator N=0). Furthermore, the comparator 
investigations featured 7 cases involving young children that fell outside the remit of 
Bluestone, as well as far fewer cases where no suspect could be identified which 
impacted upon the ability to proceed beyond the report stage. Such cases reflect the 
challenges inherent to police investigations, and are undoubtedly crucial to consider in 
academic research, not least because they allow a more robust examination of 
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particular forms of victimisation, vulnerability and related justice issues.2 However, 
some of the comparative analysis in this study necessitated the exclusion of these cases 
in order to facilitate a better understanding of relative performance (specifically, when 
addressing the case attrition data). The sample adjustments also allowed for the control 
of the difference in crime recording errors between the two sets of investigations 
(discussed further below). Without these adjustments, the comparator sample becomes 
simply too different in composition. The impact of the sample adjustments is detailed in 
Figure 1 below. This article makes reference to research findings from both the total and 
adjusted samples and care has been taken to signpost this accordingly throughout.   
Figure 1
Bluestone and comparator data adjustments
Although a quantitative, case file analysis is generally regarded as a valuable method in 
understanding the trajectory of crime reports through the criminal justice system, there 
are a range of limitations that need to be acknowledged. Firstly, although using 
electronic recording systems tend to promote consistency of format, researchers remain 
dependent on the quality of information recorded in the case files, as well as individual 
officer recording practices. It might also be the case that certain police (in)actions are 
2 The data collected during this project has research application beyond the current comparative study 
and is part of a broader project concerning rape investigation. 
Bluestone Comparator Total
Total cases reviewed 322 119 441
Less:
No crimes (adjusted 





reports -38 0 -38
251 106 357
Less:
Victims with housing 




identified -18 -4 -22
211 102 313
Less: <12yr at time report 0 -7 -7
Cases compared: 211 95 306
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not recorded and as such, case files may not be a complete record of the investigative 
process (Burton et al, 2012). Second, the description and characterisation of evidence 
might be dependent on an individual officer’s view of that evidence. This might be 
problematic where such an assessment is based on incomplete evidence, mistaken 
beliefs or unwarranted assumptions. Finally, the views of victims concerning the quality 
of the police response is normally missing from case files, and requires additional data 
to give voice to this important perspective.3     
3. Qualitative data
Using a snowball method, nine officers with experience of working in both specialist and 
non-specialist environments were identified and interviewed for the purposes of this 
research. The nine officers were comprised of three SAIT officers and six detectives, and 
were interviewed using a semi structured interview method themed around the 
following areas: experience of rape investigation, perception of the specialised 
environment, decision making, interaction with victims and provision of victim support, 
victim vulnerability and relationships with partners and support agencies. An interview 
guide was developed to ensure consistency of approach between those conducting the 
interviews. All the interviews were conducted face-to-face by members of the research 
team, and all occurred on police premises, lasting on average of one hour. The 
interviews were recorded before being transcribed and coded using an inductive 
approach to thematic analysis (Bryman and Burgess 1994). In performing this analysis, 
the research team were guided by Braun and Clarke’s (2006) six phase approach; 
specifically that of ‘familiarising’ with the data, generating initial codes, searching for 
themes, reviewing themes, defining and naming themes, and producing the report 
(which in this case, included linking it to the quantitative data). This process, though 
time consuming, was considered vital in producing a credible and trustworthy analysis 
via the thematic method (Nowell et al 2017). Though data was collected by the broader 
research team, the process of familiarizing and coding was performed by two project 
leads who worked through the entire data set concurrently. During this stage of the 
project, meetings were held on a weekly basis to discuss ‘draft’ themes emerging from 
the transcripts. Both project leads worked independently across each transcript, before 
agreeing the final themes used in the analysis. Given the need for brevity, and the small 
number of interviews, three main themes were identified for the purposes of this paper: 
‘the right people’, ‘case complexity’ and ‘team working’. Interview excerpts are also used 
to support and contextualise the attrition data further in this paper. Key decisions and 
the content of meetings between the project leads were recorded, establishing an audit 
trail to accompany the development of the analysis.   
Working in a specialist rape investigation unit: police perspectives
3 Given the focus of this research was on case trajectories, police perceptions and working practices, the 
perspectives of victims was not sought.    
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The interview data offers an insight into officer perceptions of specialist and non-
specialist policing in rape cases. However, the number of interviewees is small (9), so it 
cannot be assumed that they reflect the views of all officers. The existing literature on 
police attitudes to rape is quite limited with much of it focusing on officers’ belief in 
rape myths and victim blaming (Sleath and Bull 2017). A number of studies have found 
that the training of officers, including those who work in specialist roles with victims of 
rape, such as SAIT officers, has only limited or no impact on officers’ belief in rape myths 
or victim blaming (Lonsway et al, 2001, Sleath and Bull 2012, Hines and Murphy 2017), 
while others have found a beneficial impact (Darwinkel et al, 2013, Murphy and Hines 
2018). The current study data differ significantly from this earlier research because the 
interviews had a different focus: the experiences and views of officers working in 
specialist and non-specialist contexts, rather than a narrow focus on rape myths and 
victim blaming.  Three main themes emerged from the interview data and are set out 
below.   
Theme one: The right people 
The interview data provides useful insights into the nature of team working in the 
Bluestone unit, along with the importance of key skills, knowledge and commitment to 
rape case investigation. A number of interviewees commented on the importance of key 
knowledge and skills in rape investigations. For example, 
‘Bluestone was [about] having officers there who were interested, passionate 
and motivated around rape investigation. Having the skill set and knowledge 
around rape investigations, around the psychology of the victim, the psychology 
of the offender and … the different ways that victims present’ (Interview 7). 
Several officers also made comparative claims based on their experience of working in 
generalist, usually CID investigative contexts. One interviewee made reference to 
Bluestone as having motivated officers who ‘wanted to be on there’ and argued some 
non-specialist CID officers, with whom he had previously worked, were ‘a bit frightened’ 
of rape cases (interview 2). Another described some CID officers as ‘not being keen’ on 
rape investigations (interview 6). By contrast, a Bluestone detective linked the voluntary 
recruitment of Bluestone officers with professionalism and motivation: 
‘You’ve got … volunteers pretty much to work in [sexual offence] work so you’ve 
got that enthusiasm and you can get that professional outlook from the word go 
really … [In CID] you’ve got people “oh, I don’t want to deal with that” … So you 
haven’t got that level of enthusiasm … you know, dedication …’ (Interview 9). 
The reluctance of some individual CID officers to investigate rape cases - described by 
Interviewee 3 as ‘dead wood’ - is an illustration of one of the ways in which several 
interviewees distinguished their experience of working in the Bluestone unit from 
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previous experience of working in generalist CID squads. Interestingly, in an Australian 
study of a specialist sexual offence unit it was found that the use of experienced, 
knowledgeable officers was perceived positively by victims: ‘When victims felt reassured 
that the officer assigned to their case was experienced and knowledgeable in this area 
of work, they felt valued’ (Powell and Cauchi 2013, p. 233-234). The authors of the 
research argued that this resulted in improved victim engagement with the investigative 
process, reporting and encouraged victims to recommend reporting to others (Powell 
and Cauchi 2013, p. 234). While skilled officers work in specialist and non-specialist 
environments, it is important to note that Bluestone officer perceptions of their 
motivation and development of crucial skills  derived from investigative specialism (see 
below), dovetails with the views of victims found by  Powell and Cauchi.  
Theme two: Case complexity
The creation of the Bluestone unit was seen as important because rape was viewed as a 
‘specialist offence’ (Interviewee 1) involving complex victim circumstances and 
investigative challenges. A SAIT officer observed: ‘Rape is a very different investigative 
crime and if you get people that want to investigate that it makes such a difference 
because you get people that understand rape victims and … want to utilise the 
resources … including SAIT officers’ (Interview 4). Reflecting the specialist nature of 
crime, it has been argued that there is need for a specialist response to rape cases 
because they have characteristics, including manipulative, predatory offenders, victims 
with complex needs, trauma and vulnerabilities, that require highly-skilled officers and 
dedicated resources (Angiolini 2015, Pettitt et al, 2013, Stern 2010). Bluestone officers 
also pointed to the importance of specialism in the acquiring of key skills and 
knowledge. For example: 
  
‘[Y]ou just think of things and use that the next time and build up that bank of 
knowledge and what you know will help with the case that you might not always 
pick up on if you are dealing with lots of different types of offences’ (Interview 
2).
You are aware of the processes … and I think that’s helped in terms of when you 
… do end up in court you actually know what you are talking about …’ (Interview 
6).
In earlier domestic research, officers suggested specialism improved investigative 
expertise (Westmarland et al, 2012) and a recent HMICFRS report observed that sexual 
offence ‘investigations require officers with the highest levels of skills and competence, 
which take the longest to acquire’ (HMICFRS 2017, p. 52). Findings from the wider 
literature, combined with this study’s interview data suggest that specialist investigative 
units provide an important means of developing expertise necessary to address the 
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challenges of rape case investigation. The next theme adds another important layer to 
understand the nature and importance of specialist unit working.     
Theme three: Team working 
The creation of the Bluestone unit was intended to encourage referrals to specialist 
support agencies and a ‘joint team approach’ between detectives, Sexual Assault 
Investigation Team (SAIT) officers and support services to ensure victim co-operation 
and reduce the likelihood of withdrawal (Avon & Somerset Constabulary 2011, p. 10). 
Interviewees identified four aspects to this team working approach. First, there was a 
sense of common purpose: ‘we’ll talk [about cases] and we’re really close because it’s 
quite a small unit, everyone’s you know working towards the same thing so that’s a real 
benefit’ (Interview 3). Second, support and efficient communication was facilitated by 
the co-location of detectives and SAIT officers. Earlier research has suggested that when 
specialist officers work in the same physical space it facilitates communication (van 
Staden and Lawrence 2010, p. 4, Powell and Wright 2011-2012). Several interviewees 
concurred and reported that co-location also assisted in facilitating team working and 
mutual assistance. For example, a SAIT officer stated: ‘Having the investigator on hand is 
so much better than trying to track them down with phone calls and emails and what 
have you. So they’re in the office you can track them down and you work as a team …’ 
(Interview 4). A detective added: ‘We would all help each other, you would have the 
primary investigator … so you would know if you were the officer in the case. But then 
everyone would really help you to get those priority, quick time inquiries done’ 
(Interview 2). Third, the idea of mutual assistance inevitably involves placing confidence 
and value in the skills and abilities of others. Earlier Home Office research involving 
officers who worked in a specialist unit reported that its creation improved inter alia 
officer confidence in dealing with sexual offence cases and ‘increased confidence in each 
other’s ability’ (van Staden and Lawrence 2010, pp. 12-14). By contrast, the two non-
specialist unit SAIT officer interviewees pointed to a degree of isolation in their working 
lives: 
‘we’re sat with CID so we’re sort of more of a team of work people but they’re not 
necessarily dealing with the same work as us. So it’s not a team as in work team …’ 
(Interview 8) 
‘CID obviously have got their teams and somebody will come back into the office 
and they’ve done their bit and someone else, they’ll go “is there anything else can 
help you before we go?” … I haven’t got that. And that’s [when] sometimes I think 
‘oh that would be nice if I had someone to …’ (Interview 5)
These findings are similar to those of McMillan who interviewed SAIT officers working 
with CID detectives. She found some SAIT officers reporting that they were expected to 
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‘go it alone’ and were not always valued or supported (McMillan 2015, p. 630). This can 
be contrasted with the Bluestone SAIT officers who emphasised the team working 
approach: ‘I think it’s nice working with someone who knows the same job, maybe 
knows the same victim so that they understand the pressures that are maybe put on you 
by that victim or maybe the job or whatever … So you’re sharing the load a little bit’ 
(Interview 4). In terms of the perceived value of SAIT officers, a detective contrasted 
Bluestone with her previous experience of working in CID: ‘Outside of Bluestone there 
was very much a feeling of “I don’t need a SAIT officer I can do this myself” or “we won’t 
bother getting them in because they are too far away …”’ (Interview 7). Another 
Bluestone detective articulated the crucial role of SAIT officers:  
‘[SAIT officers] were very helpful because you could get on with the investigation 
knowing the victims were being looked after and being kept up to date … they 
would maintain that rapport and that was really good we could just carry on and 
concentrate on the investigative side and the suspects as well’ (Interview 2). 
’[W]e really benefited from the SAIT officers taking some of the pressure off us 
because dealing with the victim, updating them on, making sure they are supported 
is a big job’ (Interview 6).
The importance of team working in the context of demanding and complex 
investigations led the Stern Review to conclude that the ‘police should not have to work 
on their own to deal with rape complainants’ (Stern 2010, p. 118). The willingness of 
officers to work with other agencies is the fourth team working theme referenced by 
Bluestone officers and supports earlier findings from an Australian study of specialist 
unit working practices (Powell and Wright 2011-2012). A Bluestone detective noted: 
‘The SAIT officers, they were fantastic, working closely with the Bridge [Bristol-based 
Sexual Assault Referral Centre], that really helped. Good relationship with partner 
agencies … for me [the] One25 project [an agency supporting women involved in street 
prostitution] were fantastic’ (Interview 1). The value placed on the role of SAIT officers is 
reflected in the fact that their allocation in Bluestone investigations was the norm, 
unlike the comparator, which will be discussed later in this article. Interestingly, an 
officer observed that his personal approach to rape investigation and the role of team 
working had changed when serving in the Bluestone unit: 
‘I think what Bluestone taught me is effective partnership is just key. Looking at 
what your objective is and then just looking at the easiest way to get there by 
using partner agencies and just being really aware of that. But when I first joined 
the police, I thought it was the police’s job alone whereas now there are so many 
people that can help and assist’ (Interview 1).
The interview data differ markedly from contemporary descriptions of police attitudes, 
which are said to be reliant on myths, victim blaming, and the ‘real rape’ stereotype 
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(Sleath and Bull 2017).4 In the current study, however, the interviewees did not exhibit 
these attitudes. This might reflect the nature of the interview questions which focused 
on issues such as victim care, vulnerability, team working and rape case investigation. 
Given the number of interviewees it cannot be assumed that these findings are 
generalisable to all Bluestone officers. Further, the interview findings do not mean that 
officers did not hold negative attitudes of some sort, or that such attitudes did not 
impact on rape case decision-making. By the same token, it should not be assumed that 
negative attitudes, where they exist, inevitably influence professional behaviour (Barrett 
and Hamilton-Giachritsis 2013). 
Case file data
Sample characteristics
93.8% of Bluestone cases and 90.5% of comparator cases involved a female victim. 
16.4% of Bluestone cases involved victims with a Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) 
identity compared with 7.0% in the comparator, thus reflecting the more diverse nature 
of a city-centre environment such as the Bluestone area. In terms of age, 91.5% of 
Bluestone cases involved victims who were 16 years or older at the time of the report, 
compared to 80.4% of comparator cases; a difference that reflects the Bluestone remit 
of investigating cases involving a victim of 14 years or older. Those aged between 16 and 
25 made up the largest single group of victims in both the Bluestone investigations 
(48.0%) and comparator sample (37.0%). The age profile of the victims reflects that 
found in other studies that suggest young adult females are most at risk of rape 
(Ministry of Justice et al, 2013, p. 14). Bluestone had proportionally fewer cases 
involving intimates5 than the comparator (63.8% vs. 76.1%); more stranger rapes (10.1% 
vs. 4.3%) and more acquaintance rapes (26.1% vs. 19.6%). 
One of the more striking features of the data was the number of cases involving victims 
with multiple vulnerabilities. In defining vulnerability for the purposes of this research, 
we adopt a broad understanding of vulnerability in line with that used in previous 
research on rape (Stanko and Williams 2009), and define it to include exposure to 
economic, social, physical and emotional harm prior to, during and after rape6. Such 
cases have been shown to have lower rates of case progression in earlier research 
(Stanko and Williams, 2009; Hester, 2016). Although both data sets contained very high 
numbers of victims deemed to be vulnerable in some way (96.6% Bluestone vs. 93.6% 
comparator), more Bluestone victims were identified as having two or more 
vulnerabilities than in comparator cases (54.2% vs. 43.6%), as well as three or more 
vulnerabilities (18.1% vs. 13.8). The unadjusted data shows a much larger proportion of 
4 By contrast, a Bluestone detective stated: ‘I like dealing with sexual offences primarily because you put a lot of work 
[in] I felt like you’re really helping a proper victim’ (Interview 9).
5 ‘An intimate relationship’ for the purposes of this study, is defined as a victim and suspect in any form of intimate 
relationship, inclusive of violence between partners and family members.  
6 One of the reasons for using this broad definition lies in the frequent difficulty found in distinguishing between pre-
existing vulnerability, and post-victimisation vulnerability from the available case file data.  
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victims with multiple vulnerabilities in the Bluestone sample.7 The impact of multiple 
vulnerabilities is explored in more detail below.    
Figure 2






BME 16.4   7.0
Age >16 91.5 80.4
Aged between 16 and 25 48.0 37.0
Type of Relationship
Intimates 63.8 76.1
Strangers 10.1   4.3
Acquaintances 26.1 19.6
Vulnerabilities identified
1 or more vulnerabilities 96.6 93.6
2 or more vulnerabilities 54.2 43.6
3 or more vulnerabilities 18.1 13.8
Case attrition 
Attrition is the process whereby cases ‘drop out’ of the criminal justice system at ‘one of 
many points of exit’ (Lea et al, 2003, p. 583, Brown et al, 2007, p. 355). The main exit 
points in rape cases are at the police investigative, CPS referral, charging and court 
stages. Significant levels of attrition exist across various serious crimes (Burton et al, 
2012, p. 7) with the main point of attrition being at the investigative stage (Lea 2003, 
Brown et al, 2007, Kelly et al, 2005, Feist et al, 2007, Hester 2013, Hohl and Stanko 
2015). There are numerous factors that may influence the progression of cases through 
the criminal justice process. These include the absence/presence of corroborative 
evidence (Feist et al, p. 89, Hester 2013, p. 18), victim withdrawal, the exercise of police 
7 When considering the Bluestone and comparator samples as a whole, and without the adjustments 
identified in Figure 1, the differences in the numbers of vulnerable victims was far more pronounced. On 
an unadjusted basis, Bluestone had more cases featuring victims with two or more vulnerabilities 
compared to the comparator (60.0% vs. 40.0%), Bluestone also had more cases featuring victims with 
three or more vulnerabilities (23.0% vs. 12.0%). 
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and prosecutorial discretion, the impact of ‘schematic processing’ where myths or 
stereotypes may influence professional decision making (Hohl and Stanko 2015, p. 328), 
guilty pleas, and the standard and burden of proof in criminal cases (Bryden and 
Lengnick 1997). 
Both the Bluestone and comparator investigations shared a similar profile of attrition 
with the steepest point of drop out being at the investigative stage with 64.4% of 
Bluestone cases and 68.4% of comparator cases falling out at some point prior to 
charge. A major contributing factor to this steep decline was the removal of initially 
recorded offences under the Home Office Counting Rules (HOCR, 2017). The rules exist 
to ensure police officers appropriately record reported crime notifiable to the Home 
Office. The HOCR set out several grounds in which recorded offences can be ‘cancelled’ 
or ‘transferred’ (until April 2015 this was known as ‘no-criming’) and thus be removed 
from the recorded crime count.8 The police service has been criticised for poor crime 
recording practices, inaccurate recording and the unwarranted dismissal of allegations 
as untrue (HMIC 2014). While problems concerning reporting accuracy have been 
consistently reported (HMIC 2014, Public Administration Select Committee 2014, House 
of Commons 2014, HMICFRS 2016b) evidence suggests improvement in some force 
areas (HMICFRS 2016a; 2016b; 2016c), but problems in other force areas remain 
(HMICFRS 2018b). The current research sought to examine the nature and accuracy of 
crime recording by Bluestone and comparator area in light of the HOCR. 
Bluestone transferred or cancelled proportionally fewer cases than the comparator area 
in both 2010 and 2011 (18.6% vs. 26.5%; 9% vs. 11.3%). Analysis also revealed that 
during the financial year 2010/11 the Blueston  cancel/transfer create was lower than 
the overall rate for Avon and Somerset Constabulary (16.4% vs. 20%) (HMIC, 2015). 
Therefore, without the lower Bluestone rate, the force cancel/transfer rate for 2010/11 
would have been in excess of 20%. Overall, Bluestone officers recorded rape allegations 
in compliance with the HOCR more often than in the comparator area (76.7% vs. 64.7%). 
In the Bluestone case files, there was evidence that some officers misunderstood the 
HOCR or wrongly equated evidential uncertainty and complexity with grounds for 
cancellation. In such circumstances, the HOCR state that the ‘rape must remain 
recorded’ (Home Office 2011; 2017, section C). Similar errors were made in some 
comparator cases. There were also problems that were unique to the comparator cases. 
In one case for example, a recorded allegation was cancelled on the ground of there 
being ‘additonal verifiable information’ that no crime occurred because the victim was 
not actively engaged with the investigation. Decision-making that equates lack of 
engagement with falsity is not unique to this study (HMIC 2014, pp. 77-78) and suggests 
a poor understanding of why victims may not engage, including trauma, victim 
perceptions of the police and fear.  In another comparator case, a senior officer 
8 The previous reference to ‘no-criming’ of cases has been replaced with the use of ‘transfer’ and ‘cancel’ 
which are divided into four categories. Transferred cases are those that took place in another force area. 
Cancelled cases are those where the crime was recorded in error, constitutes part of an already recorded 
crime, or where there is ‘additional verifiable information’ (AVI) that no crime occurred. 
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explicitly acknowledged they were defying the HOCR  when cancelling a recorded rape 
allegation.
Figure 3 shows the general attrition profile of Bluestone and comparator cases, which 
indicate several points of attrition: rate of arrest (65.8% vs. 87.3%); charge (35.5% vs. 
31.5%); reached court (29.8% vs. 27.3%); conviction of any offence (15.6% vs. 22.1%); 
conviction of rape (9.4% vs. 11.5%). The data should be read with care as there are 
contextual issues that are important to understand when interpreting the progression 
data. For example, one of the most striking differences between Bluestone and the 
comparator is the arrest rate in Bluestone cases (65.8% vs. 87.3%, P<0.05). One 
explanation for this difference is that as a matter of policy the Bluestone officers were 
encouraged to invite suspects to attend interviews on a voluntary basis. One Bluestone 
detective observed that under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 Codes of 
Practice ‘there needs to be a necessity for arrest … [if] there’s no necessity to arrest 
there should be voluntary interviewing’. The detective went on to explain that arrest 
was more likely in ‘live’ case investigation or where there was a ‘need to search, secure 
evidence or if there was a danger evidence would be destroyed’ (Interview 1). 
A minor contribution to the attrition rate in both samples was the small number of 
victims who did not want a formal police investigation (3% Bluestone vs. 2% 
comparator). Under traditional performance metrics of arrest, charge and conviction, 
such cases would have no discernible outcome and could be interpreted as a criminal 
justice failure. Yet, the victim may regard his or her interaction with police positively. 
Robinson notes that successful engagement with the criminal justice process from a 
victim’s point of view may simply be making a formal statement (Robinson 2009, p. 31). 
Thus representing an example of what McGlynn and Westmarland refer to as 
‘kaleidoscope justice’ – the idea that victims’ perceptions of justice are dynamic, 
evolving and personal (McGlynn and Westmarland 2018). In the case files, victims who 
did not want a formal investigation included those who wanted to provide intelligence 
to the police or wanted officers to confirm the location of a suspect in another country. 
These met the wishes of victims at that time and provide examples of the way in which 
victim engagement with the criminal justice process is nuanced and subject to the 
wishes of individual victims.
The Bluestone investigations exhibited a higher charging rate than the comparator 
investigations (35.5% vs. 31.5%), and a somewhat higher proportion of Bluestone cases 
also reached court (29.8% vs. 27.3%) despite Bluestone having a higher concentration of 
victims with multiple vulnerabilities. The challenges these cases pose for the 
investigative process, including victim engagement and higher rates of withdrawal are 
significant.9 For those cases involving victims identified with one vulnerability, Bluestone 
9 Linear regression analysis performed on a combined sample of all Bluestone and comparator crimed 
cases (n=376) revealed that those with three or more victim vulnerabilities increased the odds of a case 
being classified as ‘No Further Action’ by 240% (p<0.05). Victim withdrawal rates in the combined 3+-
vulnerability group were 40.7%. 
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was able to achieve a greater rate of retention evidenced by higher rates of charge 
(44.9% n=40 vs. 38.2% n=18) and higher proportions of cases reaching court (38.2% 
n=34 vs. 31.9% n=15). Bluestone also had a higher charging rate in cases involving 
victims identified with two vulnerabilities (32.8% n=25 vs. 25.0% n=7) and a slightly 
higher reached court rate (27.6% n=21 vs. 25.0% n=7).10 One possible explanation for 
this is the emphasis that Bluestone placed on victim care, including greater levels of SAIT 
officer involvement and a higher proportion of victims being referred to an ISVA. The 
relationship between victim withdrawal and support referrals is discussed in more detail 
later in this paper.
Figure 3
Attrition profiles for Bluestone and the comparator
Although good police work in terms of evidence collection and victim care have an 
influence on the prospect of cases reaching the trial stage, conviction rates at trial 
10 Due to the very small number of comparator cases it is not possible to do a comparison involving cases 
with three or more victim vulnerabilities.
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cannot be considered a robust measure of police performance given the range of factors 
in operation at that stage of the criminal justice process. For this reason, it cannot be 
assumed that the lower rate of conviction in Bluestone rape cases (9.4% vs. 11.5%) and 
more noticeable difference in convictions for any offence (15.6% vs. 22.1%) resulted 
from comparatively poor practice by Bluestone officers. Indeed, factors that help explain 
the differences between the two sets of investigations were identified. For instance, of 
cases that reached court, 11.6% of Bluestone defendants pleaded guilty to rape and 
6.9% pleaded guilty to a lesser offence. For the comparator, these figures are 31.2% and 
6.2% respectively. Such differences are important and may well reflect the differing age 
profiles in the two samples. In the Bluestone sample, of rape cases that reached court 
7.9% of victims were aged between 13 and 15 at the time of reporting. This figure was 
double (15.3%) for the comparator. Given the legal age of consent (16), one might 
expect to see a higher guilty plea rate in the comparator. Indeed, 60% of the comparator 
guilty pleas involved the rape of a child. A second potential explanation for the lower 
Bluestone conviction rate is the higher proportion of cases involving victims with 
multiple vulnerabilities. While Bluestone was somewhat more successful than the 
comparator in keeping such cases in the process, the higher the number of victim 
vulnerabilities identified in a case, the more pronounced the attrition rate.   
Figure 4 illustrates that in several measures, Bluestone had more favourable case 
progression and outcomes in 'live' rape cases (those reported within seven days of the 
alleged offence and with a greater potential for evidence collection) than the 
comparator. This may be linked to the higher proportion of stranger rape cases in the 
Bluestone ‘live’ cases compared with the comparator area. 19.3% of Bluestone ‘live’ 
cases and 9.0% of comparator cases were stranger rape cases. Such cases have been 
shown to result in a higher rate of conviction than acquaintance and intimate rape cases 
in this, and previous research (Feist et al, 2007, Hester and Walker 2016). The Bluestone 
‘live’ stranger rape cases had an overall rape conviction rate of 35.2% and, of cases that 
reached trial, 71.4% included evidence of victim injury. In both sets of investigations, the 
arrest rate was higher in ‘live’ case compared to cases generally, perhaps reflecting the 
need to secure scenes of crime and maximise the opportunity for gathering forensic 
evidence. The gap between Bluestone and comparator arrest rates also narrowed. As 
with the general attrition profile in Figure 3, Bluestone’s use of voluntary suspect 
attendance may have contributed to a lower arrest rate in ‘live’ case investigations 
compared to that found in the comparator case file data. 
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Figure 4
Attrition profiles for ‘live’ cases, Bluestone and Comparator
An important factor contributing to attrition in rape cases is victim withdrawal, which 
can occur at any point in the criminal justice process (Hohl and Stanko 2015, Feist et al, 
2007). Previous research has identified many reasons for victim withdrawal, including: 
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anxieties about the criminal justice process, a victim wanting to move on and pressure 
to withdraw by third parties (Kelly et al, 2005, pp. 55-56). The current study identified 
similar reasons for withdrawal, with the most common in the Bluestone cases being: not 
wishing to go through the investigative/court process (28%), wanting to move on (14%), 
health or mental health concerns (11%) and refusal to cooperate with the police (9%). 
Despite the enhanced performance of Bluestone across several points of attrition, 
Bluestone still had a higher rate of withdrawal compared to the comparator (33.0% vs. 
21.2%). One potential explanation for the higher rate of withdrawal is that Bluestone, as 
previously noted, had more cases involving multiple vulnerabilities and these had a 
progressively higher rate of withdrawal. In Bluestone cases, withdrawal rates for victims 
with three or more vulnerabilities was 47%, compared to those with two vulnerabilities 
(37%), one vulnerability (31%) and no vulnerabilities (14%). 
Victim care
Improving victim care and welfare was a key aim of establishing the Bluestone unit 
(Avon & Somerset 2011). In the interviews, several officers commented negatively on 
the pre-Bluestone approach to victim care. For example, one detective argued that a 
‘large part’ of victim withdrawal p ior to Bluestone ‘was due to lack of support, or lack of 
information, lack of updates …’ (Interview 1). Previous research suggests that using the 
expertise and support of ISVAs, may improve certain criminal justice-related outcomes 
including ‘enabling victims to give their evidence in court, reducing retractions and 
obtaining convictions’ (Robinson 2009, p. 31). However, such findings were based on 
impressionistic assessments by interviewees, and as Robinson observes it was ‘difficult 
to substantiate these feelings with the monitoring data available at the time of writing’ 
(Robinson 2009, p. 31). Further, data derived from professionals, while undoubtedly 
important, may not match the perception of victims themselves (Campbell 2005). 
Previous specialist unit studies have also relied on interviewees who suggested 
specialism led to improvements in victim care (van Staden and Lawrence 2010, 
Westmarland et al, 2012).  Australian research by Powell and Cauchi (2013) found that 
sexual assault victims viewed the response of a specialist investigation unit more 
favourably than a non-specialist response. The current study has sought to examine 
issues of victim care via police officer interviews and crucially, two quantitative 
measures: the allocation of SAIT officers during the investigative process and police 
referrals to victim support services, including ISVAs. 
SAIT officers are trained to provide care and support to victims of rape, build rapport 
and trust, update victims on the progress of the case and act as a bridge between the 
victim and investigating officers (Horvath and Yexley 2012). Little research has explored 
the work of SAIT officers (McMillan 2015). The case files showed that within Bluestone, 
SAIT officer allocation was the norm, with only rare exceptions. For example, in a 
historic rape case, the victim said that a SAIT officer was unnecessary and was happy to 
be contacted directly by detectives working on the case. By contrast, in the comparator 
there was a SAIT officer allocation in just 41.0% of cases. In some of these cases this 
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appeared to be a mere paper allocation in the sense that there were no case file entries 
by the allocated SAIT officer or other evidence of actual SAIT officer involvement.  
In Bluestone cases, SAIT officers played a pivotal role in maintaining contact with victims 
and persuading reluctant victims to engage with the investigative process. One detective 
reflected on this: ‘we’ve dealt with cases before if it wasn’t for the SAIT officer we would 
have lost our victims. We would have lost prosecutions. We would have dangerous 
offenders still out and about in public’ (Interview 6). Previous interview-based research 
found that amongst CID detectives, victim welfare ‘took second place to their view of 
her as a source of information’ (Barrett and Hamilton-Giachritis 2013, p. 211). The 
authors of the study acknowledge that this finding may have resulted from the 
investigative role of detectives and it is worth acknowledging that SAIT officers were not 
included in the study, thus leaving out an important source of data regarding victim 
care. 
The Bluestone findings suggest a somewhat more fluid picture in terms of professional 
roles and the case files suggest detectives sometimes played a key role in providing 
victim care. There were frequent case file entries detailing investigating officers’ 
discussions concerning the welfa e of victims, evidence of intervention by detectives 
when problems emerged and examples of detectives giving re-assurance to encourage 
continued cooperation with the investigation. For example, in one case, Bluestone 
detectives made concerted efforts to find a victim with a long history of vulnerability 
after a SAIT officer had been unable to contact her. The detectives found her asleep in a 
house while heavily intoxicated and the front door open. In the case file, a detective 
logged that they had ensured she was not a danger to herself, made sure nobody else 
was in the house and secured the property. In another case, a detective spent several 
hours working with a SAIT officer trying to find appropriate accommodation for a young 
victim. There were also examples of detectives providing information or support in 
order to reduce anxiety. In one case for example, a detective explained to a victim that 
his anonymity was legally protected for life after he expressed anxiety that he might be 
named in the media. One Bluestone detective discussed his learning from his time in the 
Bluestone unit: 
‘On Bluestone, I think I developed a more caring approach to victims of crime, 
because it was very much about supporting victims, keeping them on board, 
supporting them because, to get the best evidence from them and you need them 
to be as happy as possible and supported as possible so I think my time on 
Bluestone I learnt how important it is to keep victims happy and support victims’ 
(Interview 1). 
The role of Bluestone detectives in victim care partly resulted from the practical needs 
of victims, but also from a desire to maintain contact: ‘I always like to keep in contact 
with the victims. I think it is really important that they’ve got, they know who the 
investigator is as well’ (interview 3). The comparator case files also included many 
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examples of detectives providing updates to victims and checking on relevant welfare 
issues. However, the far lower number of SAIT officer allocations made this a necessity. 
It is not possible to discern whether detectives pursuing two roles – investigative and 
victim support - impacted on the quality of the investigation or support offered, 
although one Bluestone interviewee noted how SAIT officers enabled him to effectively 
pursue his role: ‘the pressure is taken off the [detective] to do the victim side of things 
and the SAIT can do that role and allows the [detective] to get on’ (Interview 4). 
The second measure used to assess victim support in the Bluestone and comparator 
cases was the number of referrals to specialist support services, including Independent 
Sexual Violence Advisors (ISVAs). The Stern Review recommended that ISVAs be ‘an 
intrinsic part of the way rape victims are dealt with, as the service that enables the rest 
to operate effectively and a crucial part of the way in which the State fulfils its 
obligations to victims of violence’ (Stern 2010). ISVAs provide professional support to 
victims of sexual violence, including: emotional support, help and advice of a practical 
nature; help and information throughout criminal justice proceedings and have been 
shown to improve multi-agency working to support victims (Robinson 2009, Hester and 
Lilley 2015). Within the criminal justice system, ISVAs act as advocates for the victim, 
conveying the victim’s views or wishes to criminal justice agencies and accompanying 
and supporting them throughout the process. In previous research, Hester and Lilley 
found that ISVA support was ‘deemed crucial [by victims] to their progression through 
the criminal justice system’ (Hester and Lilley 2015, p. 12). The current research is the 
first to use quantitative data to examine whether ISVA support referrals reduce victim 
withdrawal from the criminal justice process (Figure 5). The data from the unadjusted 
Bluestone sample (n=278) indicates that an ISVA referral was a crucial feature of cases 
that did not result in victim withdrawal (P<0.05).11 This finding is particularly noteworthy 
because the unadjusted sample includes cases with victims suffering some of the most 
challenging personal circumstances, specifically, housing issues/homelessness and 
involvement in prostitution. Rates of support referral and victim withdrawal are 
presented comparatively below for the adjusted data.  
11 The unadjusted Bluestone sample produced a 27.1% withdrawal rate when an ISVA referral was made, 
42.8% with any other support referral and 50.9% with no support referral.
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Figure 5
Support referrals and victim withdrawal (adjusted data)12
Bluestone Comparator 
Support referrals Withdrawal rate Support referrals Withdrawal rate
















Total 155 85.1% 29.3% 64 78.0% 21.8%
No referral 27 14.8% 33.0% 18 21.9% 33.3%
Comparing Bluestone and the comparator, two further findings are of importance. First, 
in those cases where victim support was recorded there were more support referrals in 
Bluestone cases than the comparator (85.1% vs. 78.0%) and where a referral was made 
ISVA referral rates were significantly higher in Bluestone cases (72.9% n = 113 vs. 42.1% 
n=27, P<0.01). This finding suggests that Bluestone’s emphasis on victim care, along with 
its focus on multi-agency working, meant victims were more likely to be channelled to a 
vital source of specialist support. It also suggests that Bluestone officers recognised the 
important role of ISVAs in terms of support. Further, the wider literature emphasises the 
importance of a ‘joined up’, multi-agency response to complex cases, particularly to 
those involving victims with multiple vulnerabilities (Pettitt et al, 2013, Angiolini 2015, 
Ellison 2015). Improving multi-agency working to support victims was a key objective of 
the Bluestone model (Avon and Somerset 2011). One Bluestone detective contrasted 
Bluestone with the pre-Bluestone approach: 
‘There is help out there for all these victims. There’s [sic] numerous referrals to 
other agencies that will help them whereas before we probably didn’t have that. 
They would get a phone call to say “yeah somebody has been arrested, yeah see 
you in court”’ (Interview 6).  
The Bluestone case file data suggest two main reasons for not making an ISVA support 
referral. Either victims already had a history of involvement with support services and 
did not need an ISVA referral, or a victim did not want to have an ISVA referral. Even 
with the much higher referral rate, it cannot be assumed that there were not Bluestone 
cases where ISVA support was needed, but no referral was made. Despite this, the study 
has been able to establish, for the first time, that ISVA referrals have a statistically 
12 Information available in 182/211 Bluestone cases, 82/95 comparator cases.
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significant impact on victim withdrawal in cases of rape and provide further evidence of 
their value in the criminal justice process.   
Discussion 
Many forms of criminality, including terrorism, serious and organised crime and child 
abuse are commonly dealt with by specialised police units to ensure that challenging 
investigations are dealt with by highly skilled officers. It is often argued that rape cases 
have unique features that point to the need for investigative specialism, victim support, 
specialist training and assessment of officer performance (National Policing 
Improvement Agency 2010).13 Further, it is clear that many rape cases feature complex 
investigative challenges that can be explained in a number of ways. First, rape is a crime 
that can be difficult to prove to the standard required in the criminal courts given that 
many rapes are not witnessed and leave no physical, forensic or other corroborative 
evidence (Feist et al, pp. 29-31). Second, the absence of corroborative evidence of non-
consent contributes to what the Stern Review report noted as being the ‘unique 
difficulties’ faced by police ‘not present when dealing with other crimes’ (Stern 2010, p. 
45, 71. See also: Angiolini 2015, para. 434). In her review of rape case treatment in 
London, Angiolini acknowledged the complexity of rape case investigations, including 
those involving victims with complex vulnerabilities. She argued that rape cases pose 
‘unique challenges, which in their variety and complexity often far exceed the difficulties 
encountered in investigating other offences’ (Angiolini 2015, para. 30). It is the complex 
nature of these cases that has led a series of studies that emphasise the importance of 
investigative specialism in cases of rape and serious sexual assault (Stern 2010, van 
Staden and Lawrence 2010, Powell and Cauchi 2013, Angiolini 2015).
Third, rape cases require a policing response in which officers understand these  
challenges and the needs of victims who are vulnerable, traumatised and may struggle 
to engage with the investigative process. As previously noted, some of the Bluestone 
officers interviewed acknowledged the depth of knowledge and skills they gained 
through specialisation, contrasting that with their experience of non-specialist rape 
investigations. One detective observed that prior to the existence of Bluestone: ‘officer 
knowledge wasn’t there because you are dealing with so many other things as well’ 
(Interview 6). The fourth element that arguably sets many rape cases apart from other 
offences is the support victims require after reporting to the police. One of the study 
interviewees noted a shift in his own views regarding victim care after he joined the 
Bluestone unit: 
‘[Prior to Bluestone] I treated those victims as the same as a GBH victim or the 
same as a fraud victim. It’s not the same. I mean crime effects people differently, 
13 While it is very likely that rape cases have at least some unique features, the uniqueness claim is often made 
without reference to robust comparative data featuring other crimes and police investigative practices. For the 
purpose of this article, uniqueness is primarily used to denote the challenging and complex nature of rape case 
investigations for all involved. 
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but in my experience a victim of rape it doesn’t get much worse than rape in 
terms of offences that really affects the victim. So, they need that extra level of 
support’ (Interview 1). 
As noted earlier in this paper,  (see attrition section, above)  a further characteristic of 
rape cases found in this and other studies (Angiolini 2015, pp. 79-80, Kelly et al, 2005, p. 
62) are the number of victims with multiple vulnerabilities and complex personal 
circumstances who require significant levels of care and ongoing support. The higher 
rate of Bluestone SAIT officer allocation and ISVA referrals, compared to the 
comparator, provides evidence of the way in which Bluestone, with its focus on high 
quality victim care, supported victims who experience complex trauma (National 
Policing Improvement Agency 2010, p. 18, 45). Further, the Bluestone unit’s focus on 
victim care appears to have assisted in retaining a higher number of cases at the charge 
stage and marginally higher rate at the reached court stage, despite a greater overall 
withdrawal rate and higher number of complex vulnerability cases in the Bluestone 
sample. Early North American research that compared police responses before and after 
the introduction of a specialist unit found that evidence of change was quite limited and 
improvement ‘occurred at points of least resistance’ (LaFree 1989, pp. 80-89). In this 
regard, the Bluestone victim care, crime recording accuracy and case retention data 
suggest that a specialist unit can provide benefits in particularly challenging areas of 
policing. 
In addition to the Bluestone ‘team working’ findings, previous research on the work of a 
specialist sexual assault investigation unit found that investigative team working was 
aided by co-location as it facilitated support, efficient decision-making and 
communication (van Staden and Lawrence 2010). Contemporary developments appear 
to be ignoring such evidence. As noted earlier, several police forces are restructuring 
their investigative capacity in rape cases, including Greater Manchester Police which has 
disbanded its specialist sexual assault investigation unit and re-deployed officers locally. 
While a localised response no doubt has benefits, the danger of such a move is that a 
concentration of expertise and associated benefits will be lost. Instead of disbanding a 
specialist unit, the need for localised investigation capacity might be met by a modified 
operational model. For example, specialist unit officers could advise and oversee 
investigations locally for part of their working week in the same way that CPS lawyers 
would regularly visit the Bluestone unit to provide regular face-to-face advice to officers 
(Avon and Somerset 2011). It is difficult to see how the dispersal of officers across a 
force area can retain an important and arguably, unique feature of specialist units: the 
benefits of close team working, mutual support, and a sense of common purpose and 
ease of communication.
In 2017, HMICFRS acknowledged in its annual police effectiveness report that the 
creation of specialist units focusing on crimes including sexual offences ‘was a means to 
improve how they supported vulnerable people’ and the staffing of these units was seen 
as a priority by forces (HMICFRS 2017, p. 45). A year later, HMICFRS observed that the 
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quality gap between specialist and non-specialist investigations was ‘widening’, and that 
the use of  specialist teams ‘lead to satisfactory results for victims, who receive a good 
standard of service throughout’ (HMICFRS 2018, p. 51). In this report HMICFRS  
expressed concern that: 
‘in some forces prioritising resources for specialist investigative units (supporting 
vulnerable victims) is having a detrimental effect on other areas of 
investigations. While forces must find ways to support the most vulnerable, they 
should not do this at the expense of other victims …’ (HMICFRS 2018, p. 50). 
There are serious contemporary challenges in supporting vulnerable victims at a time of 
reduced police resources, large increases in recorded allegations of rape (Office of 
National Statistics 2018), a national shortage of detectives, high workloads and a growth 
in the need for specialist officers (HMICFRS 2018, p. 56). Yet, this prioritisation of 
resources is essential if the police service is to continue developing and improving its 
response to rape cases. As the HMICFRS report (2018, p. 46-47) suggests, when referring 
to investigative specialism generally, this is more likely within a specialist policing 
context, given the performance gap between the ‘generally good’ specialist and ‘all too 
often … poor’ non-specialist response.
Data concerning the financial cost of creating and maintaining specialist rape or sexual 
offence investigation units is limited and while HMICFRS raises concern over the 
prioritisation of resources, it provides no robust data on cost. The research that does 
exist indicates inter alia that concerns around resources were the most common reason 
given by forces for not creating a specialist unit (Westmarland et al, 2011, p. 19). Of 
those forces with units one reported that it ‘top sliced’ its budget to pay for the creation 
of the unit, other forces were unable to produce specific figures but stated that it was 
either ‘cost neutral … or allowed them to save money. No force seemed to think it had 
been a resource intensive exercise, and many had been established as part of force-wide 
restructures’ (Westmarland et al, 2011, p. 18). Operation Bluestone was created on a 
cost neutral basis by the redeployment of existing resources (Avon & Somerset 2011, p. 
2). It is thus important, given the current pressure on police budgets, not to assume that 
specialist units are the costliest approach. Indeed, when judging the utility of such units, 
any future cost/benefit analysis should take account of a wide range of contextual, 
investigative and other factors, including the quality and nature of victim care. The 
existing evidence supports the continued existence of specialist rape investigation units 
and indeed, the data on investigative specialism generally indicates that specialist units 




There are of course, limitations to the current study findings and methodology. The 
interview data was derived from a small sample (9), and the sample size of the 
comparator made it difficult to perform some comparisons and prevented the use of 
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more robust tests in several key areas. Given this is the first study of its type, further 
research exploring the  factors influencing case progression and outcomes using 
different models of policing, including specialist and non-specialist approaches, would 
further build the evidence base in this important area.  Finally, and most obviously, the 
current study did not include victim perspectives on police investigative practices 
support and care. While recent evidence suggests that victims view specialist units more 
favourably than non-specialist responses (Powell and Cauchi 2013), it would be helpful 
for an attempt to be made to replicate this finding.
Conclusion
This study has found that the Bluestone specialist rape investigation unit delivered a 
number of important benefits over the comparator area. In terms of traditional 
performance metrics, the specialist unit delivered higher charging and ‘reached court’ 
rates, delivered more favourable outcomes in several ‘live cases’ measures as well as 
retaining a proportionally higher number of cases involving  victims with multiple 
vulnerabilities. In addition, Bluestone officers more accurately recorded reports of rape 
compared to the comparator. This study also examined performance pertaining to 
victim care and found that the Bluestone unit outperformed the comparator in two 
areas: the allocation of SAIT officers to cases and ISVA referrals. Analysis of the 
withdrawal data indicates that an ISVA referral was a statistically significant factor in 
reducing victim withdrawal in cases processed by Bluestone.
Interestingly, the comparator had more favourable findings in several areas. The overall 
comparator withdrawal rate was lower than for Bluestone cases. In terms of conviction 
rates, the comparator had a somewhat higher conviction rate in rape cases in the 
general sample and higher conviction rate for ‘any offence’ in the general sample and 
live cases. While our analysis provides various explanations for these findings, including 
victim age and victims presenting with  multiple vulnerabilities, the findings as a whole 
are a reminder of the complexity of measuring police performance and the challenges of 
rape case progression that cannot be easily overcome.   
The police service currently operates under tight financial constraints and in the context 
of a large increase in recorded allegations of rape. While flexibility in the allocation of 
resources may be an attractive feature of non-specialist responses to rape investigation, 
this research indicates that investigative specialism in the form of a unit structure offers 
certain strengths. The qualitative data, while limited, suggested a number of positive 
aspects, with particular regard to team working and the building of investigative 
expertise. These characteristics are arguably harder to replicate in a non-specialist 
environment where officers work on a range of offences and, as a result, may lack the 
skills and expertise to work with victims of rape. Given the use of specialist units for 
other types of serious crime, the findings from this, and other studies, suggest that there 
exists a strong case for using specialist units to investigate rape. Indeed, major reviews 
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of the police response to rape and other serious crime have endorsed the need for 
investigative specialism (HMICFRS 2018) and specifically, rape and serious sexual 
offence investigative units (Stern 2010, Angiolini 2015). 
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